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The current regulatory debate in the telecommunications industry in Europe and elsewhere 
is dominated by the issue of if and how to regulate next generation networks (NGN) which 
operators plan to roll out in the near future. The crucial issue is whether an extension of 
current regulatory obligations onto future networks would hamper the investment by large 
European operators. The paper applies a real option model to explain the investment 
decision in next generation networks. One important result of the model is that regulation 
affects the investment decision only in the initial period when uncertainty is still very high. 
The real option model has been calibrated with parameters drawn from real data for a new 
entrant and from educated estimates for an established operator. Four different regulatory 
regimes and their impact on the timing of the investments have been simulated: a temporary 
regulatory holiday is shown to be an effective regulatory tool in order to induce immediate 
investments. 
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1 – Introduction 
 
The current regulatory debate in the telecommunications industry in Europe and 
elsewhere is dominated by the issue of next generation networks (NGN). The term refers to 
the installation of high-speed physical infrastructures, largely based on optical fibre, and to 
the use of platforms based on IP (Internet Protocols) for the transmission of integrated 
services for voice, data and video. Under many respects the NGNs represent a dramatic 
technological shift in the provision of telecom services: new networks enable a bandwith up 
to 100 megabits per second, as compared to the maximum of 20 megs currently available 
on DSL platforms. On the other hand, NGNs require massive investments by telecom 
operators, of the order of several billion euros in a single country, in the face of a 
widespread demand and regulatory uncertainty. Demand uncertainty arises because the new 
networks are instrumental to a host of new services for residential and corporate customers, 
such as Internet TV, e-government, e-health, e-learning and so on, whose acceptance with 
final customers is still to be ascertained. Regulatory uncertainty arises because, at this 
stage, it is still unclear whether regulators are going to carry over current obligations on 
traditional services to NGNs or to apply more lenient rules – even, possibly, a regulatory 
forbearance as in the US - taking into account that, differently from traditional networks 
built at the time of the state monopoly, NGNs do not exist yet. A summary of the regulatory 
debate in Europe will be provided below. Investment in NGNs has been relatively subdued 
until now: operators want to know the future regulation of NGNs and to have a better guess 
of demand perspectives, before committing a vast amount of resources to the new 
networks. 
This paper purports to examine the investment decision in NGNs by telecom operators, 
in the light of high demand uncertainty. To do so we exploit the real option theory, which 
allows us to include the postponement of investment among the options available to firms. 
Once the base case is defined and calibrated, different regulatory solutions will be analysed 
and their implications for the timing of the investment discussed.   4
The paper is organised as follows. In section two we give a brief overview of regulation 
and investments, notably by providing stylised facts for the next generation networks and a 
review of the literature. In section three we explain how real option theory works. Section 
four describes the model employed to test the impact of different regulatory regimes on 
investments in next generation network and discusses regulatory options. Section five 
provides our conclusions. 
 
2 – Regulation and Investment 
 
2.1 – The next generation networks 
 
In the OECD countries (OECD, 2007), investments in telecommunication networks has 
been characterised by a record growth in the period up to 2000 and by a subsequent strong 
decrease, from a value of USD 243 billion in 2000
1, which includes investment in tangible 
infrastructures
2, to below USD 160 billion in 2005. Such a decrease was mainly due to two 
factors: i) the end of the massive initial investments in access and backbone infrastructures, 
both fixed and mobile, by new entrants in the telecommunication market, led by over-
optimistic expectations on the pick up of Internet services; ii) the end of the financial 
bubble in the telecommunication industry, that pressed operators and capital markets to be 
more focused on obtaining an adequate return on investment
3. 
 
                                                           
1 Corresponding to more than three times the total investment in the sector a decade earlier. The figure 
includes auctions for licences to spectrum allocated for 3G (UMTS, IMT-2000) services for most of the 
European countries, with the exceptions of Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland and Sweden. 
2 Following OECD (2007), the main drivers for this raise in investments were construction of second 
generation wireless networks, the entry of new competitors into local access markets for fixed networks, and 
very large commitments by new entrants and incumbents in national and international backbone 
infrastructure.  
3 As one of the typical problems during the financial bubble was the funding of business plans in terms of 
coverage and demand, nowadays new entrants tend to be more focused on a local or regional level (e.g. fixed 
wireless ISPs) rather than trying to become a national service provider. The bubble in financial markets was at 
least partially caused by the same over-optimistic expectations on the future of Internet which lie at the heart 
of the massive build –up of capacity (on this see Gavosto, 2003).   5
 
Figure 1 –Public telecommunication investment as a percentage of PTO revenue  
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Source: adapted from OECD (2007). 
 
The slowdown in investment that dates back to the beginning of the decade is probably 
coming to an end. On the one hand, the excess capacity that has characterised the decade as 
a consequence of the massive build-up of transmission infrastructures from 1995 to 2000 is 
finally being eroded by the dramatic increase in demand for broadband Internet
4. 
Broadband connections all over Europe have jumped from 52.6 million in 2005 to over 70 
million in 2007 (European Commission, 2007a). On the other hand, the technological 
paradigm is shifting. Differently from the leading ADSL technology, where traditional 
analogue voice services and digital data transmission for Internet run over two different 
platforms, in next generation networks voice (typically, voice over IP), music, videos and 
all other sort of data are transported over the same integrated network.  
                                                           
4  According to standard definitions, broadband includes speeds over 125 megbits/secs, as compared to 
traditional dial-up Internet which reaches 56 megs. In Europe (Eu 25) broadband connections are offered 
mainly on copper twists through DSL technology. Other types of connections are modem cable (15%), optical 
fiber (1%) and satellite (0,19%).   6
NGNs will increase bandwith (i.e. the ”speed” of the Internet connections) dramatically, 
up to 100 megabits per second, which will enable transmission of several channels of high 
definition television and services such as e-government, e-health, e-learning and so on. 
Therefore, the next generation networks will be the leading driver of the future investment 
in telecommunication networks. The European debate mainly concerns the deployment of 
NGNs at the access (i.e. local loop) level: in this paper we will concentrate on access 
NGNs.  
Laying fibre up to the customer’s premises or close to it represents a serious financial 
effort, mainly due to the cost of obtaining building permits and of engineering works in 
urban and rural areas, which together represent from 50 to 80% of the overall capital 
expenditure
5. So far, the main European operators have announced preliminary plans of 
investment (see Figure 3). In Italy, Telecom Italia expects to invest between 6 and 7 billion 
euros in next generation networks by 2015. Such an effort will be tuned according to the 
increase of demand for services based on NGNs. 
Next generation networks have the potential to offer substantial economic benefits. They 
can: 
• lower substantially operating costs, (instead of several networks, each with its own 
provisioning and maintenance procedures, a NGN carries all traffic on a single 
network); 
• allow operators to develop services more quickly and more cheaply because 
intelligence is centralised rather than embedded in switches, (this in turn allows 
them to experiment with services to find out which ones best meet end user needs); 
• deliver higher functionality services, (because of their ability to integrate and 
bundle services). 
In other words, NGNs can both lead to cost savings in the provision of services and 
enhance revenues by enabling brand new service. 
 
 
   7
Figure 3 –Incumbent next generation access deployment plans by target date 
 
Notes: in euro terms the amounts for each operator are: FT €273m, TI €172m, DT €2,8bn, Belgacom 
€287, Verizon €16bn, AT&T €4,5bn, Swisscom €409m, HKBN €96m, NTT €36bn, KPN 
€962m. 
Source: adapted from Ofcom (2007). 
 
 
The pace with which these potential benefits are realised will clearly depend on how 
NGNs are regulated. The regulatory question for NGNs is quite well defined (its solution 
less so, as we will see). Differently from the usual regulatory problem in 
telecommunications – that is the opening up to competition of a legacy infrastructure, the 
copper network, built during the monopoly years – the question here is how to define future 
rules for networks which do not exist yet. The relevant trade off is between the incentive to 
investment and the degree of competition in the future telecommunication market. On the 
one hand, in fact, established operators, which will, inevitably, sustain most of the 
investment in several countries, are waiting to see whether regulatory authorities decide to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 See the European Commission recent Impact Assessment (European Commission, 2007b).   8
impose permanent regulation
6 wholesale obligations on the next generation networks, such 
as the ones which exist presently on traditional networks: typically the obligation to provide 
access to the established operator  network elements (for instance, the local loop) at a price 
which corresponds the full distributed cost of the service, as recorded in the regulatory 
accounting. If this were the case, one could surmise that established operators face fewer 
incentives to build NGNs, as regulation will immediately wipe out the quasi-rents arising 
from the deployment of new infrastructures. Symmetrically, the existence of wholesale 
obligations, and their scope, will also condition the behaviour of the new entrants, which 
may either decide to make major investments or to exploit the established operators' NGN 
as the latter are gradually installed (free riding behaviour), thus side-stepping significant 
fixed costs. 
On the other hand, regulatory bodies are concerned about removing any initial 
conditions of major advantage to the established operator that could preclude the 
development of a competitive market. The potential advantages are represented, on the one 
hand, by the exclusive availability of some network elements (such as reconnections from 
the cabinet to the user's premises or the ducts in which to install the fibre); on the other 
hand, by the control of an initial customer base which could enable the established operator 
to reach significant network economies before its competitors. For these reasons, regulators 
such as the European Commission are quite hostile to regulatory forbearance and regulatory 
holidays, that is the absence of all obligations on NGNs for at least a pre-defined period of 





2.2 – Literature review 
 
In highly capital intensive industries the launch of a new service or a technology often 
involves lumpy investments. Such investments are not necessarily carried out at the time 
when the investment opportunity arises, even if they are profitable (in the sense that they 
                                                           
6 As we have defined it at page 33. 
7 See the European Commission recent Impact Assessment for details (European Commission, 2007b).   9
would produce a positive discounted cash flow). Often investment opportunities are held 
“on the shelf”.  
It is generally agreed (Guthrie, 2006) that one of the main reason for this delay is the 
nature of the regulatory framework. Accordingly, economic literature on the impact of 
regulation on investments is divided into two areas of research: (i) standard investment 
analysis where the impact of regulation (either rate-of-return or incentive regulation) is 
usually evaluated in a static context, although occasionally dynamic models of investment 
behaviour
8 are applied; and (ii) real options approach. 
Several authors have focused their attention on the realistic rate of return for a regulated 
firm but none has been able to find a solution in the case of firms which undertake 
irreversible investments while constrained by incentive regulation with periodic retunes
9.  
Other authors have integrated uncertainty and irreversibility in their models and have 
considered the more general problem of setting regulated prices when faced with non-
constant demand and technology
10. Beard et al. (2003) employ a two-period model in 
which a regulator decides (i) the revenues which a firm is authorized to earn in the case that 
its assets are not stuck, and (ii) the reward which the firm will obtain if its assets are 
stranded. The less reward offered, the more profit must be allowed if the firm is to 
voluntarily invest in the project. As a result, full compensation would not be given by a 
welfare-maximizing regulator.  
Conversely the real option approach captures the notion that, in the real world, demand, 
technology, factor prices and other parameters affecting investment decisions are subject to 
many uncertainties
11. As a consequence it may be in the company’s own interest to delay 
the investment in order to acquire more information and ultimately to reduce risk. In 
                                                           
8 A survey of the static and dynamic models of investment under different forms of regulation and optimal 
(Ramsey) pricing may be found in Biglaiser and Riordan (2000). Most of this literature assumes static models 
of which the Averch-Johnson is the best known (1962). These models show that rate-of-return regulation does 
not provide the incentive for the firm to minimize costs or capital investments. 
9 Evans and Guthrie (2005) provide en exstensive review of the topic. 
10 Dobbs (2004) estimates the firm’s choice of the level and timing of investment when constrained to a price 
cap which is proportional to the established capital price; that is, the cap varies with the replacement cost of 
the firm’s assets. 
11  The literature on real-options research from the financial perspective is reviewed and integrated in 
Trigeorgis (1996); Hull (2000) has an extensive coverage of options, as does Luenberger (1998). See Smith 
and Nau (1995) for the relationship between decision trees and real options.   10
particular, in these models, regulation can restrict the flexibility of the firm through the 
introduction of constraints on prices and on costs associated with delay, abandonment, or 
shutdown/restart options. 
Although investment decisions in the telecommunications industry often involve 
both irreversibility and uncertainty, a limited literature exists on the application of real 
options to the telecommunications industry
12. 
In this paper we extend McDonald and Siegel (1986), who initiated the theory of 
irreversible investment under uncertainty in a continuous time setting – later extensively 
developed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) –, by considering investments which have finite 
lifespan, whose length is known in advance. Also we use a discrete time setting rather than 
the continuous one employed by McDonald and Siegel.  
In the next sections, we will present an illustrative example of the decision process of 
firm according to real option theory; subsequently we will describe our model and apply it 




3 – A real option theory approach to the telecommunication industry 
 
3.1 – A discrete binomial model: an illustrative example 
 
In this section we present an illustrative example with the aim at making the reader 
acquainted with the reasoning behind the optimal exercise of an option. We also introduce 
the concept of critical values (i.e. prices above which the option holder should rationally 
exercise the option) and examine how do these values vary in response to a change in the 
                                                           
12 Hausman (1999) and Pindyck (2003) applied the real options methodology to examine the sunk cost of 
assets and the delay option in the context of unbundled network elements, arguing that the regulator has not 
considered the impact of investment irreversibility when calculating rates of return of firms’ investment 
incentives. Ergas and Small (2000) examined the sunk cost of assets and the regulator’s impact on the 
distribution of returns. Small (1998) studied investment under uncertain future demand and costs with the real 
options method.  Nevertheless, these studies do not address the investment decision, they simply aim at 
calculating the real option surcharge to be included in wholesale products prices. Among others see Hausman 
(1997; 1999)   11
model inputs (stock volatility, risk free interest rate, pay out ratio, option lifespan, etc). 
Finally, we develop the parallel between a financial option and a business opportunity and 
we examine how it works in a discrete time setting. 
The example is framed within a discrete multiplicative binomial event tree. Differently 
from models in continuous time, such as those by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1973), a discrete setting helps to clarify the economic principles underlying option pricing. 
The logic that lies behind the solution of discrete time problems and that of continuous time 
problems is exactly the same: often solutions to continuous time problems are found by 
converting them into equivalent discrete settings. The numbers in this example are chosen 
to make computations simpler, but nothing of substance is lost.  
Let us consider a 3-year time horizon (see Figure 4). At time t=t1, there are two possible 
states of nature (“Up” and “Down”); at t=t2, there are four possible states of nature (“A”, 
“B”, “C” and “D”); finally at  t=t3 there are eight possible states of nature (“1”, “2”, “3”, 
“4”, “5”, “6”, “7” and “8”). 
Let us suppose that a firm can choose between a risk-free security, worth 1,000$, which 
earns 3% per annum, and an investment project which requires a 480$ disbursement, and 
whose expected net cash flow are equal to 500$ (again, the numbers are chosen for the sake 
of simplicity). The investments opportunity ceases to exist at t3 i.e. three periods after the 
investment opportunity arises. 
The firm opportunity to invest can be thought as a call option on a stock whose price 
evolves following the same stochastic process as the expected net cash flow. The strike 
price, worth 480$, is equal to the up-front disbursement required to implement the 
investment and is exogenously given. The financial equivalent of the last date at which the 
investment can be carried out (i.e. t3) is to be considered as the option expiry date.  
Let us now look at the cost associated with keeping the investment opportunity at bay 
for one period: each year of delay implies less payout (extra revenues and cost savings) to 
the company. The equivalent of the opportunity cost in the case of a call option on a quoted   12
stock is the dividend periodically paid by the company to its shareholders
13. In the example 
we assume that the payout is a fixed percentage (10%) of the net present value of the 
project at the different nodes (in financial terms, this would correspond to the stock price). 
At each node the company can either invest 480$ (exercise the option by paying the 
strike price) and receive the project NPV
14 (one share of the company) plus the period 
payout
15 (the dividend) or, conversely, it can decide to postpone the beginning of the 
investment to the next date (hold the option unexercised). The company decides what to do 
after the state of nature has revealed itself (i.e. the company knows how much the net 
present value is worth at that date). We suppose that at t3 the business opportunity ceases to 
exist and thus t3 represents the last chance the company has to start the project (to exercise 
the option). 
We can now describe the company decision process, as illustrated in Figure 4. Each 
node of the binomial tree is identified by an array of seven numbers. In the first row, we 
indicate the business opportunity value and whether it is optimal to undertake the 
investment (grey area) or not. In the second row, first column, we represent the NPV of the 
project; in the second column, the payout of the project, i.e. the extra revenues and cost 
savings, at the current date. In the third row, first column, we show the value of the risk free 
security; in the second column, the period project payout. In the third row, first column, we 
show the value of the risk free security; in the second column, the state prices of the project 
payoff which encompass all future information on the states of the nature. Finally, the 
fourth row includes the value of the business opportunity if not exercised (first column) or 
exercised (second column): clearly, the value of the option is the greater of the two. 
The market formed by the risk-free security and the project allows no arbitrage and it is 
dynamically complete. Under no arbitrage a set of state prices exist; due to market 
completeness, it is also unique. We can thus price all contingent claims by the no arbitrage. 
                                                           
13 In the case of a NGN deployment the incremental revenues and cost savings (i.e. the investment payout) 
corresponds respectively to the extra revenues arising from, say, TV on Internet plus the cost savings – mainly 
in terms of less maintenance and provisioning - induced by the replacement of the current copper access with 
NGNs. 
14 The NPV of the project is equal to the sum of the payouts from the next date to the date the projects ends. 
15 The period payout is equal to the difference between the extra revenues and cost savings realised by 
investing today and those that would arise by investing one period later.   13
At t0 the value of the project, denoted by S, is assumed to be equal to 500$. In the 
following period, t1, following the multiplicative binomial stochastic process, the NPV of 
the project can either go up by 60% to St1=St0 *(1+0.6) or go down by 20% to St1=St0*(1-
0.2). At t2 the NPV can either go up to St2=St1*(1+0.25) or go down to St2=St1*(1-0.15). 
At t3 the stock price can either go up to St3=St2*(1+0.1) or go down to St3=St2*(1-0.1).  
Note that in the example the range of the price changes in each node is chosen to make 
calculations simple. However it is greater (in absolute value) at the beginning of the project 
than at the end (60%, -20% versus ±10%) in order to capture the idea that as information 
flows in with time, demand uncertainty falls, and hence the project becomes less risky 
while earning a constant return. In fact the payout ratio (i.e. the ratio between the one 
period payout and the NPV) is kept constant through all the project lifespan. 
How do we compute the values of the option whether it is exercised or not at each node? 
If it is exercised, the value of the option, shown in the orange cell (fourth row; second 
column), is equal to the sum of the current NPV plus the period payout minus the option 
strike price. If it is not exercised, the value of the option, shown in the green cell (fourth 
row; first column), is equal to the next period payoffs (associated with adopting the optimal 
exercise policy) times the state prices
16. The American call option value, contained in the 
blue cell, is equal to the greater between these two values. 
What is the intuition? If the option is exercised, i.e. if the investment is made in the 
current period, the company will gain the extra revenues and lower costs linked to the 
immediate investment (the payout) plus the value of the project in all future periods, as 
captured by the NPV. In exchange, the company has to pay the strike price: for instance, 
the cost of deploying fibre in the access network. On the other hand, if the option is not 
exercised at tn, i.e. the investment has not been yet carried out, its value is a function of the 
payoffs at tn+1, associated with the optimal exercise policy across all future states of nature. 
In order to compute the value of the option when not exercised, one has to work backwards 
through the binomial tree, determining at each node whether or not it is optimal to exercise. 
                                                           
16 The next period payoffs (associated with adopting the optimal exercise policy) are equal to the value of the 
American call option at the next date.   14
Figure 4 –Binomial event tree 
 
t=t0    t=t1    t=t2    t=t3   
               “1”   
             675   
         Node “A”    1100 55   
             1092,7 0,39  
         570  0  675   
         1000 50     675    
       1060,9 0,32 “2”   
    Node UP   534  570  465   
       534      900 45   
                1092,7 0,58  
    360       0  465   
    800 40          465    
   1030 0,22       “3”   
   334  360       305   
   334    Node “B”    748 37,4   
           1092,7 0,39  
       234  0  305   
          680 34     305    
         1060,9 0,65 “4”   
         214  234  163   
Node t0       214      612 30,6   
                1092,7 0,58  
90             0  163   
500 25 
 
           163    
1000                “5”   
90  45             98   
89,8023         Node “C”    550 27,5   
              1092,7 0,39  
         45  0  98   
         500 25     97,5    
       1060,9 0,32 “6”   
       38  45  0   
   Node DOWN 38,3      450 22,5   
              1092,7 0,58  
   14       0  -8   
  
 
400 20          0    
    1030 0,75       “7”   
    14  -60       0   
    14,3    Node “D”    374 18,7   
              1092,7 0,39  
       0  0  -87   
          340 17     0    
         1060,9 0,65 “8”   
American call option value      0  -123 0   
Stock price  Payout      0      306 15,3   
Bond price  State price            1092,7  0,58   
Value if not exercised  Value if exercised           0  -159     15
Let us begin from the final period. If the option is still not exercised at t3, then the 
optimal policy is as follows: to exercise if the sum of the NPV and the payout (i.e. the 
payoffs obtained by exercising) exceeds the strike price; not to exercise, otherwise. Once 
the payoffs at t3 (associated with the optimal exercise policy) are known, the value of the 
option at t2 if not exercised can be computed by backward induction. At t2 the optimal 
exercise policy is to exercise if the value of the payoffs received by exercising (payout + 
NPV) exceeds the value of the unexercised option. By applying the same backward 
induction we can find the American option value at all previous nodes.  
To better understand the difference between the value of the option to invest when 
exercised and when it is not, we can be decompose it into three components
17. The first is 
the “lost payout”. When the option has been stroke early, say at tn, the company collects the 
payout (incremental revenues and cost savings) arisen at tn. If instead the company holds 
the option for one extra period, it loses the payout at tn. On the other hand, by holding the 
option for one more period, the company benefits from the postponement of the cash out-
flow: this is the second component. The third component is given by the value associated 
with protracting the period in which it is possible to choose between the two alternatives: in 
fact at the subsequent nodes the value of the unexercised option may still exceed the 
payoffs (payout + NPV) gained by exercising. We will refer to this component as the 
“reversibility component” which adds to the value of the option when not exercised. At the 
date prior to expiry (i.e. t2) the company avoids incurring losses at expiry by postponing the 
decision to invest. This is why in this case the reversibility component is referred to as the 
protection value 
We can now define the decision rule: an American option is rationally exercised when 
the value of the payout exceeds the interest cost associated with an early disbursement of 
the strike price (the “cash-out postponement”) plus the loss of the insurance against the 
possibility that payoffs at expiry are less than the strike price (the “reversibility or 
protection value”). In other words, according to the real option model, the investment is 
carried out when the revenues gained from having implemented the project exceeds the 
value of the marginal information obtained by waiting from time t0 to time t1 plus the   16
financial benefit due to the fact that the up-front disbursement investment cost (cash 
outflow) becomes smaller in present value terms. 
If volatility is zero or if all possible payoffs at expiry are above the strike price, the 
insurance component is obviously worth zero, and thus it is optimal to defer the exercise of 
the option as long as the interest savings exceeds the lost payouts. For example at the UP 
node of the event tree, the value of the cash outflow deferment is equal to 14.4 (480$ times 
the exogenous interest rate of 0.03), whereas the payout is equal to 40. Thus the benefit of 
exercising exceeds the cost and the option is rationally exercised. 
 In order to illustrate the decision process on whether to exercise or not it is useful to 
compare node t0 and node “C”. In fact, at these two nodes the NPV and the payout are the 
same; still, as we will see, in the latter case it is optimal to exercise the option while in the 
former it is not. In our example, the rate of interest is kept constant over the event tree, 
hence the cash postponement component is exogenously given and the same at both nodes 
(see Figure 5 and 6). Equally, the lost payout is the same by construction. All the difference 
is thus given to the reversibility-protection component. In particular, at node t0 the 
reversibility component is higher because the array of possible outcomes (payoffs at expiry 
prices) is much greater than those which can be reached from the node “C”: hence the value 
of the insurance against “bad” states of nature is much greater. At node “C” the range 
possible final payoffs decreases substantially since, as time elapses, some final outcomes 
can no longer be reached and the rate of change of prices at t2 (± 10%) is much smaller than 
at t0 (+60%; -20%). In a continuous time setting this is equivalent to saying that the total 
variance falls with time because the time horizon becomes shorter and the variance per unit 
of time decreases. In conclusion the optimal strategy is not exercise at t0 but to exercise at 
“C”. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
17 The value of the payoff obtained by exercising the option is usually called the intrinsic value of the option.   17
Figure 5 –Decomposition of the option value at node t0 
 























Figure 6 –Decomposition of the option value at node “C” 
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The cash outflow postponement component assumes the same value at t0, t1 and at t2 
while it is zero at t3 (at expiry the cash outflow cannot be postponed any longer). Moreover 
it is independent from the project value. The reversibility component decreases with time 
and at any date tn  it is a monotonic decreasing function of the value of the project. 
Conversely the opportunity cost (lost payout component) is independent of time, whereas it 
linearly increases with the value of the project.  
A simple argument establishes that at any tn the optimal stopping policy can be 
expressed in the following terms: exercise if Stn>S*tn; do not exercise otherwise. The 
optimal stopping rules reflects the intuition that when the stock price is sufficiently high the 
probability of incurring losses at expiry is quite low (low protection) while the lost payout 
due to because of waiting becomes significant (high opportunity cost). 
Since the value of protection falls with time, the critical values S*tn, above which it is 
optimal to carry out the project, decreases as the date of expiry becomes closer (see Figure 
7).  
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3.2 – Impact of regulation on investment: the issue of truncation  
 
The example of the previous section allows us to highlight one important result of the 
real option model as far as the impact of regulation on investment is concerned: the fact that 
the expectation of future regulatory remedies does not tilt the investment decision by the 
company. This is known as the ‘truncation’ issue. 
As we stressed earlier, the central theme of the regulatory debate is whether existing 
obligations, which basically consists of granting access to the established operator’s 
network at prices equal to costs, can be extended onto future networks without causing the 
investment in NGNs to be reduced or even cancelled. The leading view by large operators - 
which has been represented by LECG (2007) in a paper made for the organisation of 
incumbent operators - is that an extension of current obligations would lead both 
incumbents and alternative operators to reduce the amount of investment in NGNs. 
Established operators would cut back on investment because regulation will make 
perspective quasi-rents to disappear; on the other hand, alternative operators would rather 
buy the services from incumbents at regulated prices than make their own infrastructures. 
Such a view is echoed by Ofcom, the UK regulator, in a recent document on NGNs: 
“The imposition of regulatory remedies that mandate access at a specific price may result in 
asymmetric risk borne by investors and a change to the prospective returns available for an 
investing firm. .…. However a straight-forward application of the standard cost plus pricing 
approach may result in lower incentives to invest. This approach would cap the total returns 
that the firm could make if demand turned out to be high but force the firm to bear all of the 
losses in the event that there was virtually no demand” (Ofcom, 2007). 
Whereas the reasoning by Ofcom is well grounded in traditional finance models, such as 
the capital asset pricing model, in a real option context this view needs to be qualified. 
Regulatory intervention that caps the total returns affects investments in NGN negatively 
only in the initial period; in the long run, according to the real option model, investments 
are not affected.  
In order to understand this point, we have to go back to the illustrative binomial example 
of Section 3.1. As we saw, at all times between t0 and t3 the company faces a distribution of   20
possible NPVs, i.e. the present value of cash flows from the expiry date onwards, which 
will arise at the expiry date of the option which we assumed to be t3. As we move from t0 to 
t3, the spread of the expected distribution of the NPVs at t3 becomes smaller, as uncertainty 
on the project outcome wanes (and the value of reversibility is reduced as a consequence). 
By the time we reach the expiry date, t3, there is hardly any uncertainty left: the distribution 
collapses to a single value of the net present value of the project, which we assume to be 
known. As we described earlier, the decision rule is that, if at t3 the present value of cash 
flows onwards (NPV) exceeds the strike price, then the investment is carried out; otherwise 
the investment is waived for ever (see Figure 8).  
Figure 8 –Some truncation effects 
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Now let us suppose that the regulator decides to cap the company’s returns by imposing 
a cap on the overall project rate of return from the expiry date onwards. This amounts to 
prevent the company from earning the excessive payoffs, i.e. to truncate the right-hand tail 
of the distribution at the expiry date. As Ofcom correctly points out, the expected return for 
the company falls under regulation. Does this tilt the decision whether to invest in our 
model or not? It does not. In fact, in real option models the company decision to invest is 
exclusively affected by the shape of the distribution below the strike price and not by the 
shape above the strike price. 
Except in the (very unlikely) case that the regulator imposes a rate of returns cap 
permanently below zero (i.e. cumulative net cash flow falls below the investment 
disbursement) – that would cause the company to run consistent losses -, the portion of the 
NPV distribution which lies below the strike price remains unchanged even after the 
truncation imposed by the regulator: hence the incentives to invest are unaffected. Thus 
over the long run, that is from the expiry date onwards, the investment decision by the 
company is unaffected by a rate of return cap
18, at least within this real option model. 
This result holds true from t3 onwards. In the initial period, from t0 to t3, when 
uncertainty over the project outcome still exists, the intervention of the regulator does make 
a difference, however. In fact, by lowering the payout, the regulator tilts the decision of the 
company on whether to exercise the option or not by affecting the “lost payout” 
component. Obligations from the regulator make it more likely that the company postpones 
its investment decision until t3. As we shall see, this finding supports the regulatory 
prescription of relaxing regulation on NGN in the initial phase of the investment when 
uncertainty is still high.  
 
                                                           
18 Again this is true only if the regulated price allows the company to recover its initial disbursement.   22
4. – A model to evaluate investment in NGNs. 
 
This paragraph aims at identifying a model for evaluating call options for which 
premature exercise may be optimal, which captures best the characteristics of the 
investment in next generation networks by telecommunication operators
19.  
In order to apply a real option approach to investments we assume the existence of an 
asset or of a dynamic portfolio of assets which is perfectly correlated with the investment 
net cash.
 The firm’s ability to defer an irreversible investment is akin to an American call 
option. The financial option parallel arises from the fact that the firm has the opportunity - 
but not the obligation - to undertake an investment at some future moment in time.  
In real life managers evaluate investments opportunities on a monthly or quarterly basis. 
Therefore, models which allow the exercise of the option (and the evaluation of its 
optimality) at a certain pre-specified (equally spaced) dates reflect business reality better 
than those framed in continuous time settings: these are known as Bermudan options, since 
they lie in between American options (which can be exercised continuously) and European 
ones (which can be exercised only at expiry).  
In the telecommunication industry, there is still an enormous uncertainty surrounding the 
returns on services based on NGNs, as stressed at the outset of the paper. Clearly such 
services cannot be the same as the current ones based on DSL or similar technologies: if 
this were the case, there would be little point in incurring a massive disbursement such as 
the one required by NGNs, whereas operators could upgrade their network incrementally in 
order to reach higher speed and better quality of service
20. Hence NGN services and their 
prices are still clouded by a vast amount of uncertainty. 
Based on past experience, the main uncertainties regarding the project revenues and cost 
savings would typically unveil themselves within five to seven years from the emergence of 
the business opportunity. After a certain number of years, the volatility can become so 
                                                           
19 In the last decades the literature on financial option focusing on valuing call options for which premature 
exercise may be optimal has been abundant. For a brief presentation of the various techniques and approaches 
available see Gekse and Shastri (1985). 
20 In certain areas where the telecommunications copper network encounters serious bottlenecks or congestion 
issues, it may be theoretically convenient to invest in NGNs due to the cost savings brought about by the 
optical fibre, rather than upgrade the existing network. However these case seem very limited in scope.   23
small that it no longer affects the overall profitability of the projects. This implies that 
optimal “now or never” decisions are taken before expiry
21. When the volatility of the 
project becomes negligible, the reversibility component tends to zero and the remaining 
lifespan of the option does not affect the optimality rule computed at the previous nodes. In 
order to model business opportunities whose volatility disappears after a certain number of 
years, we make use of finitely lived options.  
The Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) model lends itself to be employed for finitely 
lived Bermudan options. It discretises both time and price changes through a recombining 
symmetric binomial tree. The distribution of dividends and price changes occur at discrete 
time intervals. Due to the recursive structure of the problem the solution is obtained 
through iteration.  
In the following we will test the model first by applying it to a new entrant operator that 
decided to invest in FttH technology back in 2005; then to an established operator, which 





4.1 – Model input parameters 
 
The Cox et al. (1979) model requires the following parameters:  
•  current expected net present value of the project, denoted by NPV 
•  up-front investment, denotes by UI 
•  net cash flow lost by a one year postponement of the project 
  commencement date, denoted by PO (Pay Out) ;  
•  annualised logarithmic volatility of the project returns, denoted by VOL 
 (Volatility); 
•  risk free rate, denoted by Rf; 
                                                           
21 An optimal “now or never” decision is a one whose optimality remains unchanged over time. 
22 Very few established operators in Europe have already began the deployment of access NGNs.   24
•  number of years after which the sign of the overall project profitability 
  ceases to be a stochastic variable (i.e. years to expiry), denoted by YtE 
 
The model outcomes (option pricing, optimal timing, optimal policy) are homogeneous 
of degree zero with respect to NPV and UI. This allows to establish the optimality of 
investments on the basis of the profitability of a single NGN connection. The VOL variable 
measures the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of projects returns (i.e. ratio of 
NPV at tn to NPV at tn-1). The PO variable is expressed as percentage of NPV. 
In order to define the VOL parameter, i.e. the NPV annualized volatility, we need to rely 
on the existence of a NGN pure player which is traded on an exchange market. We have 
decided base our calibration on Citéfibre, a small scale fibre-to-the home Parisian operator. 
Citéfibre was established in October 2004 and it was floated on the EuroNext Paris 
exchange on the 2
nd December 2005. After the signature of an agreement with the 
Municipality of Paris in the beginning of 2005, Citéfibre began the actual fibre rollout in 
the second half of 2005
23. 
In our simulations the initial phase of the project life, the one surrounded by uncertainty, 
is assumed to last for six years. The parameters of the model can be separated in two 
categories: general inputs and operators’ idiosyncratic inputs. The risk-free rate and years 
to expiry are both general inputs to the model, while the remaining parameters depend on 
the characteristics of the specific NGN investment plan (either new entrant’s or established 
operator’s).  
 
                                                           
23 On 20 october 2006 when Iliad announced the acquisition of CitéFibre, the FttH operator had more than 
500 clients, 3,000 kilometres of optical fibres and 130 buildings with optical fibre cabling (representing some 
4,000 households potentially connected to the network) in the 15th arrondissement of Paris. At that time 
Citéfibre already held authorisations allowing it to connect another 4,000 households. See: An overview of 
FiberDirk van der Woude Program manager FttH & broadband services City of Amsterdam August 15th , 
2007 edition.    25
 
4.1.1 – General inputs 
 
The risk-free rate is assumed to be constant and equal to 5.5% over the first phase of the 
project. The risk-free rate corresponds roughly to the average cost of money in Europe over 
the past twenty years. 
The number of years after which main uncertainties disappear is assumed to be six years. 
This is the average time lag between when the front-runner European telecommunication 
operator adopts a new technology and when the last follower introduces it. The project time 
optimality is evaluated every quarter. 
 
4.1.1.1 – Citéfibre specific inputs 
 
The actual fibre roll-out of Paris by Citéfibre began in the second half of 2005: this is the 
date when the investment opportunity was irreversibly converted into a business plan. We 
make use of the standard hypothesis of rational expectations: as a consequence, we assume 
that the actual data on the relevant variables (volatility, annual payout and expected NPV) 
from 2005 onwards correspond to the expectations formed by Citéfibre at the time when the 
decision was made. 
The market expectation of the NPV of cash flows associated with a single fibre 
connection has been obtained by dividing the enterprise value (market capitalisation + debt) 
at December 2005 by the expected number of homed passed at the same date
24.  
The annual payout per connection has been estimated by dividing the 2006 Citéfibre 
revenues by the average number of the homes passed by the end of 2005 and those passed 
by the end of 2006. We assume that a one-year investment postponement causes revenues 
to be lost for the following three years, although by a decreasing amount: hence the initial 
delay does not lead to a parallel shift over time in the flow of revenues but the gap is filled 
in a 3-year time horizon. Three years were in fact the expected time by a new entrant such 
as Citéfibre in order to reach its target penetration. Three years also reflect the average time 
needed for a new entrant to catch up with the market share reached by operators which had   26
invested one year earlier (see Figure 9). Thus the value assigned to the payout variable in 
the Citéfibre case is obtained by multiplying by three the foregone revenues suffered in the 
period in which the decision to postpone was made.  
Per unit up-front costs are estimated by resorting to a study of the investment costs of 
NGN published the French telecommunications regulator Arcep (2006): the average cost 
estimated by Arcep (€500) has been decreased to take into account that in Paris the roll-out 
of the fibre is less expensive due to the possibility of exploiting the sewage system. A 
sanity check of this value has been carried out by comparing with the value inferred 
directly using Citéfibre available data. The up-front cost is therefore assumed to be equal to 
€400. 
 
Figure 9 – Revenues lost by investing one year later 
 
 
The annualized volatility of the log return has been estimated using bi-weekly stock 
returns. Since Citéfibre was floated on Euronext on the 2
nd December 2005, the sample size 
is slightly above 45 observations. A higher frequency would have increased the accuracy of 
the estimate by increasing the number of observations; however this might have entailed an 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
24 Prior to December 2005 Citéfibre was not traded and thus this is the first market capitalisation availble.   27
upward biased due to the very low liquidity of the stock. The Citéfibre input data are shown 
in Table 1. 






















4.1.1.2 – Established telecommunication operator inputs 
 
Parameters of an NGN investment by an established telecommunication operator differ 
significantly from those applicable to a start-up firm. This is because all parameters and 
outcomes have to be evaluated in incremental terms. For instance, the expected NPV of the 
project is not equal to the overall project cash flow but it is computed as the incremental 
revenues following the introduction of the new asset. The same logic applies to the 
evaluation of the payout ratio and of up-front costs.  
Also, in the case of the established operator, per unit up-front cost is based on the Arcep 
study. The input value to the model takes into account that an established operator has to 
incur some capital expenditures anyway (for instance, for the maintenance and upgrade of 
traditional copper lines), even if it does not undertake the NGN investment.  
The annual payouts (incremental revenues + cost savings) are computed as in the 
Citéfibre example. The annual payout is thus equal to the difference between the NPV of 
the cash flows if the investment is undertaken today and the net cash flows realised in the   28
case of a 1-year postponement. The NPV is obtained by applying the perpetuity formula to 
the annual net cash flow generated by the introduction of the new asset. 
The net cash flows associated with an NGN project for an established operator do not 
arise only from incremental revenues but also by cost savings. This clearly affects the 
volatility of the NPV, since cost savings are reasonably steady and predictable. We have 
assumed that in the case of an established operator half of the net cash flows derive from 
incremental revenues: the VOL variable for an established operator is thus set equal to half 
of that of Citéfibre
25. Table 2 shows established telecommunication operator input data. 
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25 This might lead to some underestimation of the actual volatility since also the cost saving part is subject to 
a certain degree of volatility, depending on the mix of single-play and multiple-play offers. Cost savings 
induced by an NGN deployment are significantly more relevant when customers subscribe to multiple-play 
offers (e.g. voice and internet access, or voice and IPTV etc). A sensitivity analisys has thus been conducted 
by assigning to the cost saving half of the average volatility of main historical European operators.    29
 
4.2 – Model outcome and the role of regulation 
 
As already said, we follow the Cox et al. (1979) model to investigate the impact of 
different regulatory regimes onto NGN investment decisions. Its outcomes include 
expected optimal investment timing and optimal investment policy (i.e. critical values)
26. 
Since the timing of the investment is of particular interest to policy makers and to national 
sectors regulators, we will focus on the interval between when the investment opportunity 
arises and when the investment is expected to be undertaken, named fugit. The central 
results of the simulations for the input data shown in Tables 1 and 2 are represented in 
Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 – Number of years before the investment is undertaken 













For the sake of simplicity we divide the project lifespan into three phases. The first 
phase includes the first six years of the project lifespan, which we define as the “volatile” 
phase. The second phase (the “steady” phase) embraces years from the seven to the twelve, 
while the third phase (the “terminal” one) includes the remaining years of the project 
lifespan (from the thirteen to infinity). Differently from the steady and the terminal phases, 
to refrain from the irreversible decision entails an insurance value in the volatile one. 
                                                           
26 Critical values can be used to determine the optimal subsidy i.e. the artificial increase of the NPV (either in 
absolute term or expressed as a percentage) enabling a change of the today optimal policy outcome from 
“delay the investment” to “invest now”.   30
The parameters used for Citéfibre reflect the assumption that the new entrant operates 
in absence of any regulation. By calibrating the model with the parameters of the new 
entrant operator (see Table 3), we obtain a fugit variable equal to 0 (highlighted cell). The 
model correctly predicts that the optimal policy for Citéfibre in the second half of 2005 was 
to undertake the investment (which it did).  
The volatility of returns on the investment carried out by the Parisian FttH operator is 
such that any reduction of cash flows during the “volatile phase” (top row; left column) or 
of cash flows in the “steady phase” (middle row; left column) tilts the decision to invest. 
Thus, all regulatory interventions on the new entrant would prevent it from investing. The 
outcome and a sensitivity analysis for a new entrant operator are presented in Table 3.  
The sensitivity analysis concerns the up-front cost of the investment (strike price), 
which is allowed to vary by ±12% with respect to the base value; the payout rate, whose 
interval is assumed to lie in between ±0.5 around the central value of 1.2%; the volatility, 
which we allow to be lower than the reported value of 0.78, if the stock were more liquid; 
the NPV (asset price) of the project which can vary by ±20%. In most cases, the optimal 
time to invest remains “now”. As expected, the investment tends to be deferred (up to 
almost four years) when the investment cost rises or its payout falls; on the other hand, as 
the NPV decreases, the project is delayed because the probability of not recovering the 
upfront costs increases. 
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Table 3 – Citéfibre outcomes data 
 
     Volatility 






   5622  7027  8432  5622 7027 8432 5622  7027  8432 
0.007  2.04  0.00  0.00  2.27 1.88 0.00  3.36 2.33  1.96 
0.012  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 1.99  0.00  0.00  352 
0.017  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.007  2.16 1.76  0.00  3.24 2.15 1.51 3.68  2.39  2.25 
0.012  0.00  0.00 0.00 1.52  0.00  0.00  2.27  0.00  0.00  400 
0.017  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
0.007  3.09 2.05  0.00  3.55 2.27 2.05 3.78  3.37  2.36 
0.012  0.00 0.00  0.00  2.15  0.00  0.00  2.38 2.16  0.00  448 
0.017  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.00  0.00  0.00 
 
 
We can now turn to the case of the established operator. While in the case of the new 
entrant we assumed absence of any regulation, with the established operator we are 
interested at looking at the impact of different regulations on the timing of investment. We 
consider four different regulatory scenarios: 1) Forbearance (absence of regulation); 2) 
Permanent regulation; 3) Sunset clause; 4) Regulatory holiday. The intervention by the 
regulator consists of a decrease in the annual net cash flow of the established operator by 
27.5%. This reduction corresponds to a halving of the cost savings and the extra profits of 
NGNs.  
Initially we assume that the established operator is the only one which is evaluating 
whether to invest in NGNs: the competitive situation is such that no alternative operator is 
looking at building a next generation infrastructure. Therefore the incumbent has not to 
rush (or delay) the investment in order to compete with infrastructure-based new entrants 
(or to exploit somebody else’s network). In practice, with limited exceptions such as 
Fastweb in Italy and Free in France, so far only incumbents have announced wide-ranging 
investment plans in NGNs: the assumption can thus be considered quite realistic. On the   32
other hand, by neglecting the competitive interplay between established operators and 
competitors, a relevant factor in deciding the optimal timing of investment in NGNs might 
be missed.  
  
Regulatory forbearance.  The regulatory forbearance consists of withdrawing sector-
specific  ex ante regulation on next generation networks, i.e. mandated access to the 
infrastructures and setting of the price at which access is imposed
27. In the regulatory 
forbearance, the authority leaves returns uncapped in both the volatile and the steady phase. 
The forbearance scenario is modelled by assigning to the NPV and PO their initial values 
i.e. those included in Table 2. 
Results (see Figure 10 for a summary and Table 4 for the whole set) are obtained by 
setting the up-front investment equal to €440 and the volatility equal to 0.45: they are 
shown in the highlighted 3x3 matrix of Table 4. In the forbearance scenario (bottom row; 
right column), which corresponds to the highest payout rate and NPV, investment is 
undertaken immediately. 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted on the investment up-front cost (±14%) and on 
volatility. In all cases, except when the up-front investment cost and volatility take both 
their highest values, in which case fugit is equal to two years, forbearance leads to 
immediate investment.  
From the point of view of our model, the regulatory forbearance is the most effective 
solution in order to enhance investments. In fact the company decision to invest is based on 
expectations of unconstrained net cash flows (both NPV and payout are unconstrained). 
Clearly, our framework is inadequate to examine the competition issues raised by the 
regulatory forbearance, which are causing so much concern with the European Commission 
and regulators everywhere in Europe. In fact our model is only concerned with the amount 
and the timing of investments: hence a regulatory forbearance is a first best solution almost 
by construction.  
                                                           
27Regulatory forbearance on the roll-out of optical fibre has taken place in US following a petition by Verizon 
to the Federal Commission for Communications.   33
In order to take care of the concerns by the EC, we should have introduced a different 
objective function, based on the consumers’ welfare (or possibly the total welfare), to be 
maximised. There are basically two ways to do so. One is to introduce the amount of 
investment directly in the welfare function, as in Brandão and Sarmento (2007) and Kalmus 
and Wiethaus (2006): the argument is that investment increases the quality of service, 
hence benefits consumers directly. In the case of next generation networks, it can be argued 
that new fibre infrastructures will indeed reduce the number of technical faults in the 
network. However, in this case, the model would not include an obvious trade-off between 
the degree of competition and the amount of investment. The second possibility is to 
incorporate in the model the notion that, if forbearance leads to less competition in the 
marketplace and therefore to an exit of alternative operators, then the established operator 
which builds the NGNs may have to forego some extra revenues at the wholesale level. 
These extensions are left for future work. 
 
Permanent regulation. This measure is at the opposite extreme of the regulatory 
spectrum than forbearance. The idea is that incumbent operators are forced by the regulator 
to supply a wholesale service (bit-stream) based on NGN on request to alternative 
operators. This option has been entertained by several European regulators, including the 
Italian one. European established operators have usually retorted that the sale of wholesale 
services based on NGN should take place under commercial freedom. Of course, one 
crucial issue is the price of the wholesale service: Ofcom for instance has mentioned the 
possibility to adjust the reference price of the NGN bit-stream in order to take into account 
the risk of the investment.  
In a permanent regulation scenario, national regulatory authorities cap returns both in the 
volatile and in the steady phase. Permanent regulation is modelled by a 27.5% reduction of 
PO, whose rate now becomes equal to 4%, and by a reduction of the NPV equivalent to a 
27.5% of the cash flow over a period extended to 12 years, which is now equal to €1,291. 
The lost payout, the expected NPV at the initial date and the NPV at expiry are all 
reduced as a consequence: it becomes more convenient not to exercise the option than in 
the forbearance case. As it can be seen in Table 4, the permanent regulation scenario   34
(middle row, left column) implies in fact an expected postponement of the investment of 
about two years
28. Sensitivity analysis suggests that the delay increases with the strike price 
and the volatility, up to 3.48 years when both parameters take their maximum values in the 
exercise. 
 
Sunset clause. Sunset clauses are a regulatory tool which is more widespread in the US 
than in Europe. Still, it could help to overcome some of the regulatory concerns raised by 
the deployment of NGNs. The measure is that established operators which build new 
networks are compelled to provide a wholesale permanent regulation bit-stream service 
based on NGN, such as the one we discussed in the previous case, for a pre-determined 
period of time. The rationale is that established operators can allegedly exploit the 
advantage of having a larger market share to start with: hence, in principle, they need less 
time to recoup the massive investment costs of NGNs. With a sunset close obligation, 
alternative operators can make use of the established operator’s infrastructures, while they 
build their own customer base and overcome the initial competitive disadvantage. After a 
pre-defined number of years, the established operator is no longer obliged to rent the NGN 
infrastructures at a cost and the alternative operators may either rent at commercial 
conditions or build their own networks. The main rationale of the sunset clause is that it 
creates the proper incentives for alternative operators to build their own infrastructures, 
while at the same time reducing only partially the incentive for the established operator to 
construct its own network. 
The sunset clause scenario corresponds to a regulatory policy which intervenes in the 
volatile phase, while it leaves returns uncapped in the steady phase of the project. In terms 
of our model, the sunset clause scenario is modelled by subtracting to the initial value of 
the NPV the 27.5 % of the net cash flow realised over a six year period (NPV is thus equal 
to €1,388) and by reducing the initial PO by 27.5%, down to 4%. The sunset clause (middle 
row centre column) results in a expected investment postponement of almost two years 
(1.95).  
                                                           
28 Again, our model is not suited to examine the consequence of such measures on the degree of competition 
in the telecom markets.   35
Albeit the sunset clause can be preferred on theoretical grounds, our simulation suggests 
that investment in NGNs ends up being postponed by almost the same amount of time as in 
the permanent regulation case. This is because it affects the investment return during the 
period – the first six years - in which it matters most for the purpose of the investment 
decision, as uncertainty is still high and it makes sense to wait before undertaking the 
project. 
The sensitivity analysis shows that the waiting time is typically either zero or around 
two years. Only when volatility and the up-front cost take the highest values, then the 
postponement overcomes three years. In all instances the waiting time in the susnset clause 
is slightly lower than the corresponding time under permanent regulation. 
 
Regulatory holiday. This is another intermediate solution between the regulatory 
forbearance and the permanent regulation. The regulator should impose no regulatory 
obligations on the investments implemented in the initial period of the project up to the 
expiry date. The rationale is that, in a real option framework, it is the uncertainty on the 
distribution of future cash flows, hence of the net present values, which causes the company 
to put off the project. As we saw, such uncertainty is very high at the beginning, when the 
value of the reversibility (or protection) component is at its zenith. Uncertainty, hence the 
insurance element, tends to become smaller in the following periods. If the aim of the 
regulator is to create an environment conducive to investments, then it may decide to scrap 
all regulatory obligations until uncertainty becomes sufficiently small. After that date, the 
regulator can impose obligations with an impact on cash flows. 
The benefit of a multiphase regulation policy that adjusts its tightness to the expected 
decrease of the risk over time is twofold: it would act as an effective incentive where it is 
needed (i.e. when the protection value against downside potential would refrain 
telecommunication operators from investing); when the circumstances will be such as to 
justify fibre deployment irrespectively of the regulatory context, the major benefit of the 
investment could be directly transferred to consumers through the promotion of a fiercer 
service based competition at retail level.  
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The proposed regulatory policy differs substantially from the regulatory holiday called 
for by Deutsche Telekom
29 for two main reasons: 1) it does not require a removal of all 
forms of regulation (access, non discrimination, transparency obligation may indeed be 
preserved) but it simply envisages a more favourable rate of return on investments 
undertaken in the volatile phase; 2) the timeframe of the lenient regulatory phase is to be set 
according to the reduction in the volatility rather than being based on the operator actual 
investment plan: if the established operator does not launch its service within a certain date, 
the more favourable regulatory conditions will be foregone
30. 
The regulatory holiday scenario is modelled by subtracting to the NPV initial value 
27.5% of the net cash flow realised over a six year period (down to €1,388)
31, whereas the 
value of the payout rate is left as in the forbearance case (5.5%). The regulatory holiday 
scenario (bottom row; middle column) results in immediate investment, as in the 
forbearance case. This can be explained by the fact that the regulatory intervention applies 
only to the period when uncertainty on the project returns is gone: hence, it does not affect 
the decision on whether to undertake the project.  
If we vary the values of the parameters, the fugit time remains basically unaffected and 
equal to zero. Only when the up-front cost increases, then the investment is delayed by 
around two years also in the regulatory holiday scenario. 
 
In all scenarios the terminal phase of the project is assumed to be fully competitive and 
thus out of the scope of regulation
32. 
                                                           
29 In Germany, it was intruduced through a specific amendment to the German Law of Telecommunications. 
Such legal prevision has been fiercely opposed by the European Commission on the ground that the 
established operators would be able to limit the availability of access of new entrants, undermining 
competition in the market place. On this issue he EC has started an infringement procedure against Germany. 
30 The regulatory holiday invoked by Deusche Telecom would be effective from the date of deployment. 
31 The impact of regulation on NPV is measured as a percentage reduction of the cash flows accrued in the 
period regulation operates. Due to discounting the absolute value of foregone cash flows in a sunset clause 
scenario would be higher than absolute value of foregone cash flows due to a sunset clause policy. However 
since the aim of the model is to compare how the two alternative regulatory regimes perform in terms of 
incentives to invest with respect to their different time scopes we decided to neglect the discounting effect. 
This is done by applying the same NPV reduction both under the regulatory holiday scenario and the sunset 
clause scenario. 
32 Note that in the sunset clause and in the regulatory holiday regimes, the length of the volatile and that of the 
steady phase have been purportedly chosen to be the same in order to avoid that the model outcomes were 
influenced by the different time length of the period subject to regulation.    37
By increasing the volatility (VOL) up to 0.5, the optimal policy associated with sunset 
clause or permanent regulation increases the expected investment postponement to more 
than two years, while in the other two scenarios it does not change. Conversely, by setting 
the VOL equal to 0.4 the optimal policy suggests not to invest in the permanent regulation 
scenario, while it dictates an immediate investment commitment under all other scenarios.  
 
 
Table 4 – Established telecommunication operator outcomes data 
 
     Volatility 






    1291  1388  1485  1291 1388 1485 1291  1388  1485 
0.025  1.93  1.84  1.69  3.06 2.58 1.96 3.36  3.29  2.98 
0.040  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.37  0.00 0.00 2.07 1.91  0.00  378 
0.055  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.025 3.18  2.96 1.93 3.39  3.26  3.16 3.93  3.48  3.41 
0.040 1.78  0.00 0.00 2.04  1.95  1.38 2.78  2.15  2.07  440 
0.055  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.08  0.00 0.00 
0.025  3.90  3.29  3.16  4.09 3.87 3.39 4.31  4.19  3.93 
0.040  2.01  1.94  1.64  3.17 2.10 2.04 3.48  3.25  2.17  502 
0.055  0.00 0.00  0.00  2.08 1.77 0.00  2.25 2.18  2.08 
 
 
As general result we note that, as expected, a sunset clause approach always induces a 
longer expected investment postponement than that induced by a regulatory holiday. This is 
equivalent to say that, all other conditions being equal, in terms of investments incentive, 
the regulatory holiday scenario performs always better than sunset clause scenario.  
 
Duopoly. In this scenario we relax the assumption that it is only the incumbent operator 
which invests in NGNs. We assume that a second, smaller, operator exists in the market 
and that it too intends to invest in next generation networks. For the sake of simplicity we 
assume that the alternative operator aims at a market share in NGN access and services of 
35%, which corresponds roughly to the average market share in the broadband market of   38
alternative operators according to the Ecta scorecard. Hence the future revenues stream of 
the established operator (the NPV) will be reduced by 35% with respect to the baseline case  
of a single monopolist
33.  
  The opening up of the market to competition will affect the timing of the investment 
decision vis-à-vis the case of a single monopolist. Two opposite forces are at work here. 
One is the already mentioned reduction in future revenues due to the existence of a 
competitor: this is tantamount to a (negative) income effect, which decreases the NPV and 
puts off the beginning of the investment.  
  The second force depends on who is the first to invest, whether the incumbent or the 
alternative operator. If the established operator is the first mover, prima facie we can 
assume that the operator incurs in no specific cost in order to attract its customer base, vis-
à-vis the monopolist case
34. In other words, the demand for NGN services requires no 
particular advertising campaign for the first mover. 
  Let us suppose now that the established operator has to catch up with a competitor which 
has already started to invest in next generation networks. Thus, in order to reach its long-
term market share which we assume to be equal to 65%, the incumbent needs to make an 
additional effort to subtract part of the clientèle from the alternative operator, by facing 
extra costs. We assume that these costs are identical to the ones that an operator faces in 
order to conquer customers from competitors in the broadband market, i.e. xx euro per 
client. These costs would reduce the payout by an equal amount: hence it is in the interest 
of the operator to speed up the beginning of the investment with respect to the monopoly 
case. Hence this effect goes in opposite direction than the reduction in NPV. 
  Such a cost asymmetry between being a first or a second mover is a bit artificial of 
course. It is more likely that both operators face subscriber acquisition costs (maybe not of 
the same amount) independently of whether they act as first or second. We would need  a 
full blown theoretical model in order to study how the two operators can leapfrog each 
other in this case, while here we take the pecking odere for granted. However it is still 
                                                           
33 The implicit assumption is that the price of NGN access and services is the same for the established and the 
alternative operators 
34 Excluding the reduction in NPV generated by the presence of a competitor   39




5 – Concluding remarks 
 
 
In this paper we constructed a real option model in order to study the investment 
decision of telecommunications operators in next generation networks (NGNs). In 
particular we try to answer the question on whether the extension of current regulatory 
obligations on dominant companies may hamper the investment in NGNs or not. The real 
option model allows to capture the vast uncertainty surrounding the projected returns and 
cost savings of services based on NGNs both for established operators and new entrants and 
thus to attach an economic value to the option of postponing the investment decision.  
We concentrate on the timing of the investment as the relevant variable, thus neglecting 
both the amount of the investment and the impact on consumers’ welfare. The latter 
omission is of particular concern as, when it comes to assess the different regulatory 
regimes, our analysis is per force limited at best. We hope to include the welfare aspect in 
future extensions of this work. Another possible extension concerns the introduction of 
more than one players in the market and how does this affect the timing of the investment. 
An interesting feature of the real option model regards the so-called truncation issue: 
regulatory intervention that caps the total returns affects investments in NGN negatively 
only in the initial period; in the long run, according to the real option model, investments 
are not affected insofar as the portion of the net present value distribution which lies below 
the strike price remains unchanged even after the truncation imposed by the regulator. 
We calibrate the real option model with actual data coming from a floated new entrant 
operator, Citéfibre, specialised in services based on optical fibre; we make also use of 
estimates for incumbent operators (there are not actual data available, yet), based on a 
number of studies and reasonable conjectures. The output of the model suggests that the 
new entrant was right in undertaking the investment when it did: this is of some comfort as 
to the model robustness.   40
  In the case of the established operator, we consider four alternative regulatory 
regimes: 1) Forbearance (absence of regulation); 2) Permanent regulation; 3) Sunset 
clause (regulation only in the initial period of the project, so as to incentive investment in 
alternative infrastructures); 4) Regulatory holiday (absence of regulation in the initial 
period of the project, when uncertainty on the returns is particularly high). The intervention 
by the regulator is modelled as a decrease in the annual net cash flow of the established 
operator by 27.5%. This reduction corresponds to a halving of the cost savings and the 
extra profits of NGNs.  
The outcomes of the simulations suggest that investment is carried out immediately 
under forbearance (as expected) and regulatory holiday regimes; it is delayed by around 
two years in the other cases. As far as the timing of the investment is concerned, the 
regulatory holiday appears superior to the other regulatory options. 
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